**Plan**

#### The United States federal judiciary should apply a clear statement principle to the statutorily defined indefinite detention war powers authority of the President of the United States on the grounds that executive indefinite detention violates the Suspension Clause.

**advantage 1 – Afghanistan**

**Afghanistan is adopting detention policies modeled off US law- this makes instability inevitable**

**Rodgers 12** (Chris Rogers is a human rights lawyer for the Open Society Foundations specializing in human rights and conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan, May 14, “Karzai's bid for a dictatorial detention law”, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/14/karzais\_bid\_for\_a\_dictatorial\_detention\_law)

As part of the agreement to transfer control of Bagram, **the Afghan government is creating the authority to hold individuals without charge or trial for an indefinite period of time on security grounds-a power it has never before said it needed.** While such "administrative detention" regimes are permissible under the laws of war, **this new detention power is being established in order to hand over a U.S. detention facility, not because changes in the conflict have convinced Afghan officials that it is necessary**. A surge in U.S. detention operations like night raids has driven the prison population to over 3,000 detainees, most of whom the United States lacks evidence against for prosecution under Afghans law. **Because the Afghan constitution, like the United States', protects individuals from being detained without charge or trial, the Afghan government needs a new detention law, which is now being modeled on deeply problematic U.S. detention policies and practices.** As a result, **Bagram's real legacy may be the establishment of a detention regime that will be ripe for abuse in a country with pervasive corruption and weak rule of law.** Despite potentially far-reaching consequences, **the development of this new detention power has been hidden from public view**. **When I met with leading Afghan lawyers and civil society organizations in Kabul several weeks ago, few knew that the government was proposing to create a new, non-criminal detention regime.** Their reaction was disbelief and dismay. **None had even seen a copy of the proposed regime, which the Afghan government has not made public and is trying to adopt by presidential fiat.** **The Open Society Foundations recently obtained a copy of the proposed detention regime, and after review, we have found what it details deeply troubling**. **The proposed changes leave open critical questions** about the nature and scope of this proposed detention regime, **which if left unanswered make it ripe for abuse. Who can be held in administrative detention and for how long? Where will it apply? When will the government cease to have this power? How will the government ensure it will not be abused to imprison the innocent or suppress political opposition?** **Most alarming is the failure to address the serious, long-term risks posed by such a regim**e. From apartheid South Africa to modern day China, administrative **detention regimes adopted on security grounds have too often been used as tools of repression**. In Egypt, the former government used administrative detention for decades to commit gross human rights violations and suppress political opposition, relying on a state of emergency declared in 1958, and nominally lifted only after last year's revolution. Across the border in Pakistan, the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulations are another stark reminder of the long, dark shadow that such legal regimes can cast. The ongoing imposition of these British, colonial-era laws, which among other things legalize collective punishment and detention without trial, are cited by many as a key driver of the rise of militancy in the tribal areas of Pakistan. **But there is still time for the United States to avoid this legacy in Afghanistan.** If the Afghan government cannot be dissuaded from adopting an administrative detention regime, then the United States should urge the Afghan government to include provisions that limit its scope and reduce its vulnerability to abuse. First, a ‘sunset' provision should be adopted, which would impose a time limit on such powers, or require an act by the Afghan Parliament to extend their duration. Second, the regime should be limited to individuals currently held by the United States at Bagram prison. There is no clear reason why the handover of Bagram detainees requires the creation of a nation-wide administrative detention regime. More generally, the scope of who can be detained must be clearly defined and limited. Third, **detainees must have right to counsel as well as access to the evidence used against them in order to have a meaningful opportunity to challenge their detention-a fundamental right in international law**. **At present it seems the government will follow the well-documented due process shortfalls of the U.S. model.** **The United States and its Afghan partners must be honest about the serious, long-term risks of establishing an administrative detention regime in Afghanistan-particularly one that lacks clear limits and is democratically unaccountable**. Protection from arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life or liberty is at the constitutional core of the United States, and is essential to lasting stability and security in Afghanistan**. Living up to the President's promise of responsibly ending the war in Afghanistan requires defending, not betraying this principle.**

**Detention policy has prevented rule of law restoration in Afghanistan- judicial modeling makes US action key**

**ICG 10** (International Crisis Group, November 17, “REFORMING AFGHANISTAN’S BROKEN JUDICIARY”, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx)

**U.S. detention policy has frequently been cited by Afghan and international legal experts as** one of **the chief obstacles to restoring balance to the Afghan justice system and citizens’ faith in the rule of law**.233 The operation of parallel U.S.-controlled prisons has been problematic from the start**. Thousands of Afghans have been detained since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 without recourse to trial or the means to challenge their detention.** Abuse of prisoners at the U.S.-run Bagram Theatre Internment Facility in the early years of its operation under the Bush administration has been well documented, including the use of harsh interrogation techniques that resulted in the deaths of two Afghans.234 **Extrajudicial detentions at Bagram have eroded support for foreign troops and for many Afghans** – **Pashtuns in particular** – **stand as a symbol of oppression.** Like its sister facility at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo, Cuba, the Bagram prison has provided much grist for Taliban propaganda mills.235 **U.S. officials under the Obama administration appear to have begun to recognise that extrajudicial detentions have negatively impacted Afghan perceptions of the rule of law.** In January 2009, the U.S. government announced plans to close the facility at Guantanamo and to re-evaluate its detainee programs overall. A U.S. federal district court ruling in April 2009 concluding that non-Afghan detainees held at the Bagram facility have a right to challenge their detention in American courts has hastened the need to find solutions to the legal conundrum posed by the extrajudicial status of prisoners at Bagram.236 In September 2009, the U.S. Department of Defense adopted a new framework for evaluating the status of detainees in U.S. facilities in Afghanistan. Responsibility for detainee policy and operations now falls to Task Force 435, an interagency unit under joint military-civilian leadership whose mission is to bring detention and rule of law practices in line with U.S. strategic goals in Afghanistan. The old Bagram facility has since been replaced by the more modern Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), which opened in 2009 at the edge of the Bagram military base. Under this new policy, new detainee review board (DRB) procedures were adopted to bring detention practices in Afghanistan more in line with U.S. and international law. They replaced the Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Boards, which had been generally deemed inadequate because they afforded detainees few, if any, opportunities to challenge their arrest or to review evidence in cases brought against them in closed hearings. **Under the new procedures, a military panel determines if a detainee has been properly captured and poses a future threat to the Afghan government or international security forces. Although the U.S. government is careful not to characterise the proceedings as legal or adversarial in the sense that a trial might be, detainees are allowed to some extent to present their version of events with the help of a U.S.-assigned “personal representative”. Hundreds of detainees have had their cases reviewed since the new review procedures were adopted and a number have been released because of insufficient evidence that they posed a threat to the Afghan government**.237 **These new guidelines are an important step forward**, **but they are far from replicating internationally recognised fair trial standards**. **A number of other actions must be taken to make U.S. detention policy more transparent, humane and fair and to bring it in line with international law**. Specifically**, U.S. investigation and intelligence gathering standards must be improved and the review board process must incorporate a more vigorous mechanism that allows detainees to review and challenge evidence brought against them, including measures for classified evidence**. Transition to Afghan control of specially designated detainees will also necessitate a re-evaluation of classification procedures both at the point of capture and across agencies – both Afghan and U.S. The current process of declassifying information is far too cumbersome and there is a demand for greater clarity on the rules of transfer of information from coalition and Afghan sources to Afghan government sources.238 Changes in declassification policy will necessitate a serious review of current Afghan law and investigative practices and procedures employed by the Afghan National Directorate of Security and other security organs. In January 2010, the U.S. and Afghan government signed a memorandum of understanding calling for the DFIP to pass from U.S. to Afghan control in July 2011. By that time, review proceedings should be conducted entirely by Afghan judges and prosecutors; an Afghan judge in the Parwan provincial courts has already reviewed a number of detainee cases.239 **The U.S. has set up a rule of law centre at the new facility with a view to training Afghan legal professionals to build cases against the roughly 1,100 detainees housed at the prison. The training and transition are important first steps toward dismantling the parallel legal systems that have co-existed uneasily in Afghanistan since the start of the U.S. military engagement. The transition could entail some tricky procedural challenges** in terms of potential conflicts between Afghan courts and U.S. military authorities over the danger posed by “highrisk” detainees.240 This and other issues should be clarified before the transition in 2011.

**Starting with US policy is key- it will restore credibility in our system and allows us to improve the Afghani justice system**

**Eviatar 12** (Daphne Eviatar Law and Security Program Human Rights First, 1-9, “The Latest Skirmish in Afghanistan: Hate to Say We Told You So”, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2012/01/09/the-latest-skirmish-in-afghanistan-hate-to-say-we-told-you-so/)

**Responsibility begins with due process.** As we wrote in our report in May, based on our observations of the hearings given to detainees at the U.S.-run detention facility at Bagram: “**the current system of administrative hearings provided by the U.S. military fails to provide detainees with an adequate opportunity to defend themselves against charges that they are collaborating with insurgents and present a threat to U.S. forces**.” As a result, **the U.S. hearings “fall short of minimum standards of due process required by international law.”** For President Karzai, that’s an argument that the U.S. should immediately turn the thousands of detainees it’s holding over to the government of Afghanistan. But that would do little to solve the problem. TheUnited Nations reported in October that Afghanistan’s intelligence service systematically tortures detainees during interrogations. **The U.S. government cannot hand prisoners over to the Afghans if they’re likely to be tortured, according to its obligations under international law. And unfortunately, as we also noted in our report, the Afghan justice system, although improving with the growing introduction of defense lawyers, is still hardly a model of due process. Still, unlike the United States, at least Afghan law does not permit detention without criminal charge, trial and conviction. The United States hasn’t exactly proven itself the best model for the Afghan justice system. Restoring U.S. credibility is going to be key to our ability to withdraw from Afghanistan** **without it becoming a future threat to U.S. national security**. **The U.S. government can’t credibly insist that the Afghans improve their justice system and treatment of detainees if the U.S. military doesn’t first get its own detention house in order. Whether for the sake of international law, U.S. credibility, or merely to improve relations with the Karzai government, upon which U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan depends, the U.S. military needs to start providing real justice to the thousands of prisoners in its custody.**

**Judicial action is key to international credibility and restoring the rule of law**

**Hecht, 05** (Daryl, Judge for the Iowa Court of Appeals, 50 S.D. L. REV. 78, lexis)
Americans proclaim with some justification that liberty and human rights are among the crown jewels of their national identity. Claiming the status of human rights watchdogs around the globe, representatives of the United States government commonly criticize human rights failures of other nations. If such criticism is to be taken seriously and carry force abroad when well-founded, the United States government must heed its own admonitions. It should accord due process not only to all persons detained within its borders but also to those it imprisons offshore at locations under the exclusive control of the United States. **Affirmation by federal courts of the liberty interests of alien prisoners** imprisoned on Guantanamo **would give important symbolic assurance to** citizens of the United States, **foreign nationals, friends, and foes that liberty is a cherished universal human right** that does not persist or perish according to technicalities such as geographic boundaries. As they clarify the nature and extent of process due the Guantanamo prisoners, federal courts will consider the Eisentrager Court's concerns about the prospect that thorough judicial review might disrupt war efforts. [288](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n288) The realities [\*111] of war may justify reasonable restriction of the process available to prisoners of war during times of armed conflict and justify some judicial deference allowing the executive to conduct military campaigns with a minimum of distraction. However, **the risk that the war effort will be disrupted by judicial** or administrative **review** of the grounds for detention **are diminished** in these cases **because** the prison is distant from the present theaters of war. **Modern technology will facilitate the presentation of evidence at remote sites** in ways not contemplated by the Court in the Eisentrager era **and will render unpersuasive many of the Executive's war-powers arguments** against meaningful judicial review. The recent commencement of administrative hearings conducted by the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and the discharge of some of the Guantanamo prisoners are positive developments. It remains to be seen whether federal courts will conclude these administrative tribunals within the Executive branch allow for meaningful review of the prisoners' status. Although passage of the Military Tribunals Act of 2003 would, especially with suggested amendments, alleviate many of the most egregious legal infirmities associated with the ongoing detention of uncharged prisoners, a timely legislative solution to the problem through the action of the political branches of government is unlikely. The best and perhaps only prospect for meaningful protection of the uncharged detainees' rights against indefinite imprisonment lies in the litigation pending in federal courts. The remaining uncharged prisoners have languished too long in prison without charge or access to counsel, and the courts must be vigilant to prevent the continuation of arbitrary detentions in violation of international humanitarian and human rights principles. Alien prisoners ought not be disqualified from fundamental constitutional protections solely as a consequence of the government's choice of an off-shore location for their confinement. If deprivation of aliens' property interests may legally be imposed within the United States only in conformity with due process principles, the liberty interests of aliens held on Guantanamo should receive no less protection against state action. It should be understood that arguments in favor of meaningful review of the status of the Guantanamo prisoners is not an argument for the immediate release of all aliens imprisoned on Guantanamo. The evidence presented in habeas proceedings or in fair administrative tribunal hearings may establish reasonable grounds to believe some petitioners are properly designated and detained as enemy combatants. Under international humanitarian law, they may be detained during the conflict, but it seems evident that the GPW did not contemplate perpetual imprisonment without charge during an interminable war. [289](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n289) The [\*112] evidence offered in a meaningful review process may support war crimes charges against some of the prisoners who will be tried before military commissions under the regulations adopted by the Department of Defense. If the evidence establishes that still other prisoners have, as they allege, been improvidently incarcerated, they should be promptly discharged. In Korematsu v. United States, [290](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n290) the Court deferred during a declared war to the Executive's decision to evacuate persons of Japanese ancestry from locations on the west coast and relocate them in internment camps without the benefit of charges or hearings. That decision has since been widely criticized, and at least one member of the Court later publicly regretted his vote to defer to the military's judgment of necessity. [291](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n291) In 1976, as part of the celebration of the Bicentennial of the Constitution, President Gerald Ford issued a proclamation acknowledging that the internment of the Japanese Americans, many of whom were citizens, during World War II was wrong and calling upon the United States to "resolve that this kind of action shall never again be repeated." [292](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n292) Federal courts now have the opportunity to revisit the appropriate balance between precious civil liberties and measures properly taken in furtherance of national security during times of crisis. As the proper balance is recalibrated to fit the circumstances presented in the Guantanamo litigation, the courts can interrupt the "all too easy slide from a case of genuine military necessity ... to one where the threat is not critical and the power [sought to be exercised is] either dubious or nonexistent." [293](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n293)**If the Guantanamo litigation forces meaningful review of the prisoners' status, it will advance the rule of law and model a fundamental principle of international leadership**. **"If the U**nited**S**tates **represents values that others want to follow, it will cost us less to lead**." [294](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=938acabc8d208f2c7d5fa60db492ee72&docnum=98&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=eeae0c139818f7b3acae88f6aed6f150&focBudTerms=supreme%20court%20should%20w/30%20guantanamo%20and%20deference%20and%20date%3E2001&focBudSel=all#n294) There is, of course, no doubt that the United States has the military power to ignore the prisoners' liberty interests and continue to hold them indefinitely without charge. But the raw power to maintain the status quo provides no legal justification consistent with reason, fundamental human rights, and principles of limited government for doing so.

**Only restoring confidence in their judiciary system can make our post-drawdown COIN strategy successful**

**ICG 10** (International Crisis Group, November 17, “REFORMING AFGHANISTAN’S BROKEN JUDICIARY”, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx)

**A substantial course correction is needed to restore the rule of law in Afghanistan**. Protecting citizens from crime and abuses of the law is elemental to state legitimacy. **Most Afghans do not enjoy such protections and their access to justice institutions is extremely limited**. As a result**, appeal to the harsh justice of the Taliban has become increasingly prevalent**. **In those rare instances when Afghans do appeal to the courts for redress, they find uneducated judges on the bench and underpaid prosecutors looking for bribes**. Few judicial officials have obtained enough education and experience to efficiently execute their duties to uphold and enforce the law. Endemic problems with communications, transport, infrastructure and lack of electricity mean that it is likely that the Afghan justice system will remain dysfunctional for some time to come. **Restoring public confidence in the judiciary is critical to a successful counter-insurgency strategy**. The deep-seated corruption and high levels of dysfunction within justice institutions have driven a wedge between the government and the people. **The insurgency is likely to widen further if Kabul does not move more swiftly to remove barriers to reform. The first order of business must be to develop a multi-year plan aimed at comprehensive training and education for every judge and prosecutor who enters the system**. Pay-and-rank reform must be implemented in the attorney general’s office without further delay**. Building human capacity is essential to changing the system. Protecting that capacity, and providing real security for judges, prosecutors and other judicial staff is crucial to sustaining the system as a whole**. The international community and the Afghan government need to work together more closely to identify ways to strengthen justice institutions**. A key part of any such effort will necessarily involve a comprehensive assessment of the current judicial infrastructure on a province-byprovince basis with a view to scrutinising everything** from caseloads to personnel performance. This must be done regularly to ensure that programming and funding for judicial reform remains dynamic and responsive to real needs. More emphasis must be placed on public education about how the system works and where there are challenges. Transparency must be the rule of thumb for both the government and the international community when it comes to publishing information about judicial institutions. Little will change without more public dialogue about how to improve the justice system. **The distortions created in the justice system by lack of due process and arbitrary detentions under both Afghan institutions and the U.S. military are highly problematic**. **Until there is a substantial change in U.S. policy that provides for the transparent application of justice and fair trials for detainees, the insurgency will always be able to challenge the validity of the international community’s claim that it is genuinely interested in the restoration of the rule of law**. If the international community is serious about this claim, then more must be done to ensure that the transition from U.S. to Afghan control of detention facilities is smooth, transparent and adheres to international law.

**Unsuccessful drawdown makes nuclear war inevitable**

**Cronin 13** (Audrey Kurth Cronin is Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University and author of How Terrorism Ends and Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria. Thinking Long on Afghanistan: Could it be Neutralized? Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 36:1 pp. 55\_72<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.751650>)

**With ISAF withdrawal inevitable, a** **sea change** **is** already **underway**: **the question is whether the** **U**nited **S**tates **will be** **ahead of the curve or** **behind it.** Under current circumstances, key actions within Afghanistan by any one state are perceived to have a deleterious effect on the interests of other competing states, so the only feasible solution is to discourage all of them from interfering in a neutralized state. **As the** **U**nited **S**tates **draws down** over the next two years, **yielding to** regional **anarchy would be** **irresponsible.** **Allowing neighbors to** rely on bilateral measures, **jockey for relative position**, and pursue conflicting national interests **without regard for dangerous regional dynamics** **will result in** a **repeat of the pattern** that has played out in Afghanistan for the **past thirty years\_**/except this time the outcome could be not just terrorism but **nuclear war.**

**Judicial reform is key to long term stability**

**The Nation 9** (Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/11-Nov-2009/UN-body-urges-Karzai-to-fight-corruption)

UNITED NATIONS - **The UN General Assembly has urged** the government of re-elected Afghan President Hamid **Karzai to press ahead with “strengthening of the rule of law and democratic processes**, the fight against corruption (**and**) **the acceleration of justice sector reform**.” The 192-member assembly made that call Monday night by unanimously adopting a resolution that also declared that Afghanistan’s presidential election “credible” and “legitimate”, despite allegations of widespread fraud that led Karzai’s main challenger Abdullah Abdullah to pull out of the run-off round of the election. But the UN assembly raised no doubts about Karzai’s mandate or his right to continue leading the war-torn country. The resolution welcomed “the efforts of the relevant institutions to address irregularities identified by the electoral institutions in Afghanistan and to ensure a credible and legitimate process in accordance with the Afghan Election Law and in the framework of the Afghan Constitution.” **It appealed to the international community to help Afghanistan in countering the challenges of the militants’ attacks that threaten its democratic process and and economic development**. Before the assembly approved the resolution, 24 countries, including Pakistan, spoke in the debate on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan in which they stressed the need for the Afghan Government and the global community to work closely together. Pakistan’s Acting Permanent Representative Amjad Hussain Sial said **the core of violence and conflict in Afghanistan emanated from terrorist groups, foreign militants such as Al-Qaeda, and militant Taliban who were not prepared to reconcile and give up fighting.** The nexus with drug traders was increasingly discernable. **The key to long-term stability in Afghanistan**, he said, **was reformation of** thecountry’s corrupt **governmental systems**. Equally important was building the civilian institutions at the central and subnational levels.

#### **Great powers will get involved- Afghanistan stability is the key internal link**

Blank 12 (Stephen, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, as served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; and taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio; and at the University of California, Riverside, holds a B.A. in history from the University of Pennsylvania, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from the University of Chicago, January 27, 2012, “Whither the new great game in Central Asia?”, pdf)

Although many scholars dislike the term “great game”¶ or “new great game” because to them these terms smack of¶ echoes of the imperial rivalry of the nineteenth and¶ twentieth centuries; the point of the term “new great¶ game” is precisely that we have surmounted the era and¶ what we see now is something entirely different. This¶ difference does not, however, mean that we have seen the¶ end of policies resembling those of the age of imperialism.¶ First, there is an enormous competition among the US,¶ Russia, India, and China for military bases in Central Asia.¶ All of these states either have bases, have had bases, or have¶ sought bases in Central Asia in the last decade and the¶ growth of the CSTO eloquently testifies to the continuation¶ of the military dimension in the great powers’ search for¶ security in Central Asia. The different factor today is that¶ local governments of their own accord are actively soliciting¶ US military involvement if not that of Russia and China¶ for the reasons outlined above (Kucera, 2011a).¶ Similarly we see what amounts to naked land grabs by¶ the great powers, albeit on a relatively small scale in Central¶ Asia. For example, Tajikistan has been induced to surrender¶ to China 1100 square miles (2000 ha of land) to Chinese¶ farmers. Allegedly this “rectification” of the borders¶ ensures Tajikistan’s inviolability of its borders, definitively¶ solves its border problems with China, and ensures its¶ stability “for decades to come.” (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2011c)¶ But that statement implies that without this agreement¶ Tajikistan’s security vis-à-vis China would have been¶ questioned if not at risk. And the further details of this¶ agreement indicate the visible presence of Chinese power¶ in Dushanbe’s decision-making.¶ This agreement, allegedly based on a prior accord¶ between the two governments in 2002 that was ratified¶ again in 2010 cedes about 1000 square km in the Pamir¶ Mountains to China, about 1 percent of Tajikistan, albeit¶ a sparsely settled area (Singh, 2011; Pannier, 2011a, 2011b).¶ Tajikistan’s government hailed this as a victory because¶ China had actually claimed some 28,000 km and settled for¶ only about 3.5 percent of its claims. Moreover, Shukhrob¶ Sharipov, Director of the Presidential Center for Strategic¶ Studies, argued that, “If we hadn’t decided to transfer the¶ land (at this time), we would not have been able to resist¶ China’s pressure” (Pannier, 2011a, 2011b). This remark¶ basically sums up the nature of Central Asian states’ relationship¶ to China.¶ This agreement clearly also conformed to the pattern we¶ have seen in China’s earlier expansionist activities vis-à-vis¶ Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Worse yet, the raw material¶ resources in the land ceded by Tajikistan allegedly equals¶ the entire Chinese investment in Tajikistan to date. Thus¶ China has allegedly recouped its investment at no cost to¶ itself and has both the land and its resources as well as¶ maintaining its investments and penetration of Tajikistan¶ (Singh, 2011). On the other hand, these deals triggered¶ a strong political backlash in all three countries against¶ China and its perceived intentions. Perhaps Tajikistan’s¶ backlash was triggered more by the fact that between 1500¶ and 2000 Chinese farmers will settle another 2000 ha of¶ land beyond the border agreement (Pannier, 2011a, 2011b).¶ According to the opposition Tajikistan is becoming¶ increasingly economically dependent on China due to its¶ large investment in the area and this causes great resentment.¶ Attacks on Chinese workers in other countries also¶ testifies to this backlash across Central Asia.¶ At the same time, we might also point to the following¶ likely developments in what presently constitutes the great¶ power rivalry for influence in Central Asia. In the current¶ configuration it is not only the great powers: US, Russia,¶ China, India, and the EU who are pursuing influence, access,¶ and leverage in Central Asia, indeed, middle ranking¶ powers: Pakistan and Iran are clearly enhancing their¶ efforts to improve relations with all the actors in Central¶ Asia as are South Korea and Japan in order to obtain¶ economic-political and possibly even strategic benefits.¶ Third, beyond these aforementioned trends, regional¶ actors like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have already begun¶ to take actions to shape their security environment as their¶ power and wealth grows and second, in the expectation of¶ both the US withdrawal and concurrently intensified Sino-¶ Russian pressure upon them and rivalry with each other for¶ precedence in Central Asia. Indeed, we even find Uzbekistan¶ and Kazakhstan thinking of projecting their influence¶ and power into neighboring Central Asian states like¶ Kyrgyzstan either through investments as in Kazakhstan’s¶ case or in more direct military threats and interference in¶ other states’ economic activity as we often see with Uzbekistan¶ (Weitz, 2008b). But we also find that on occasion, e.g.¶ during the Kyrgyz revolution of 2010, these two governments¶ engaged each other in substantive disussions about¶ possible reactions and power projection into Kyrgyzstan.¶ Fourth, international financial institutions (IFI) like the¶ Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the UN and its¶ agencies like the UN Development Program (UNDP), are¶ also heavily involved in major projects and policies here.¶ Finally, and perhaps most important, as a mark of distinction¶ from the imperial past, each of the Central Asian states¶ is now a fully empowered (at least formally) state and¶ sovereign foreign policy actor. Consequently each one is¶ conducting its own version, insofar as possible, of a multivector¶ or more accurately balancing approach attempting¶ to balance all the multiple external sources of benefits to¶ them to enhance their domestic stability.¶ Therefore, based on the foregoing we can point to¶ certain likely developments regarding interstate rivalry¶ and especially great or major power rivalry and competition¶ in Central Asia for the foreseeable future. First, because the effort to define and gain control over Central Asia or at¶ least gain lasting influence over it coincides with the¶ escalation of the war in Afghanistan since 2008 the stakes¶ involved in the effort to direct the destiny of Central Asia¶ Central Asia have grown. Though the following assertion by¶ Ahmed Rashid may somewhat exaggerate the importance¶ of these stakes, from the standpoint of regional governments¶ this is actually an understatement because they¶ believe their fate is linked with that of Afghanistan. Thus¶ Rashid writes that,¶ The consequences of state failure in any single country¶ are unimaginable. At stake in Afghanistan is not just the¶ future of President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan people¶ yearning for stability, development, and education but¶ also the entire global alliance that is trying to keep¶ Afghanistan together. At stake are the futures of the¶ United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¶ (NATO), the European Union, and of course America’s¶ own power and prestige. It is difficult to imagine how¶ NATO could survive as the West’s leading alliance if the¶ Taliban are not defeated in Afghanistan or if Bin Laden¶ remains at large indefinitely.(Rashid, 2009, p. xxxix)¶ Those stakes also involve the other states of Central Asia¶ as well since it is widely believed that a Taliban victory in¶ Afghanistan makes them a prime target for insurgency in¶ the future. Especially in the light of fears for the stability of¶ the Karzai government and the overall region in the light of¶ a US withdrawal, every state, large or small, is jockeying for¶ greater capability and power in the region and some, like¶ Uzbekistan, clearly expect both to have to project power¶ and that they will be asked to project power to neighbors to¶ preserve stability in the area after 2014. Second, as Emelian¶ Kavalski has observed, the nature of what we call the “new¶ great game,” the proliferation of actors in a continuous¶ multi-dimensional struggle for influence in Central Asia¶ precludes any one actor obtaining previous levels of¶ imperial or neo-imperial domination, though Russia still¶ tries for it, and has led to a situation where, given the¶ concurrent proliferation of actors and agents operating in¶ Central Asia,¶ The simultaneity of these two dynamics reveals that the¶ agency of external actors is distinguished not by an¶ imperial desire for the control of territory, but by the¶ establishment of ‘niches of influence.’ Consequently, the¶ notion of the ‘new great game’ comes to characterize the¶ dynamics of processing, selection and internalization of¶ some externally promoted ideas and not others. (Rashid,¶ 2009, p. xxxix).¶ Third, in view of the impending US military withdrawal¶ ssit is not clear that Washington, confronted by wrenching¶ fiscal stresses, either has the vision or the means to develop¶ or implement a coherent post-Afghanistan Central Asian¶ strategy, a vacuum could well develop there with regard to¶ the US position that will inevitably be filled by other actors.¶ Certainly there is no sign yet of what will replace the US¶ military presence after 2014 and no sign of a formal¶ document worked out with Afghanistan that delineates the¶ extent to which a US presence in the region will look like. In¶ the absence of such a policy statement every regional actor¶ is hedging its bets and preparing for the worst in the future,¶ a trend that most likely means intensified competition¶ among the great, regional, and local powers for influence in¶ Central Asia.¶

#### There’s no check on escalation- 2014 is the key year for stability- unsuccessful withdrawal makes war inevitable

Gupta 14 -- Anubhav, Asia Society, Senior Program officer for the Asia Society Policy Institute, 2014, asiasociety.org/blog/asia/2014-south-asias-make-or-break-year

2013 was a difficult year for South Asia. The year, which began portentously with the beheading of an Indian soldier, saw over 150 ceasefire violations between India and Pakistan. Violence along their border brought high-level diplomatic dialogue to a halt. There was trouble brewing inside Kashmir as well. The militancy, which had cooled considerably over the past decade, began to smolder once again. For the first time in ten years, terrorism-related deaths in the state were higher than the previous year. And Afghanistan continued to struggle with instability and weak governance, so much so that at the end of 2013 a U.S. intelligence assessment predicted an especially bleak future for the country.¶ This year could define the fate of the region for years to come. The leaders of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States have an opportunity to secure a more stable future or risk the outbreak of greater conflict. As is often the case in South Asia, success is far from certain. Before the United States draws down its military presence in Afghanistan, it must redouble its diplomatic engagement with South Asia and pursue a regional strategy to enhance stability.¶ The Tough Road Ahead for India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan¶ With presidential elections and the end of NATO’s combat mission coming up, 2014 is perhaps most critical for Afghanistan. Unfortunately, there remains uncertainty on both fronts. After months of negotiating, the U.S. and Afghanistan finally brokered a bilateral security agreement in November, providing a legal framework for a small number of U.S. troops to remain in the country post-2014 to train, advise, and support Afghan forces as well as carry out some counterterrorism operations.¶ Shortly after the agreement was finalized, President Hamid Karzai stymied U.S. plans by deciding to delay signing the agreement until after the 2014 elections or until the U.S. agrees to certain preconditions it finds unacceptable. Though U.S. troops have largely handed off security responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces, there is a general consensus that a small contingent of U.S. troops is necessary to ensure stability. Military planning for the troop draw down and a limited presence post-2014 requires time. If this issue is not resolved soon, the U.S. could withdraw all troops in 2014, which could be calamitous for stability in the country.

**Independently, Instability results in multiple conflict scenarios specifically- Indo-Pak**

**Carafano ’10** (Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe By JAMES JAY CARAFANO   Saturday, Jan. 2, 2010 James Jay Carafano is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies)

There’s little chance Kabul will become Saigon 1968. If the war in Afghanistan starts going south for allied forces, President Obama will probably quit rather than risk getting bogged down. President Lyndon B. Johnson considered Vietnam more a distraction than a national mission, yet he ramped up the troop commitment all the same. In 1968, the North Vietnamese launched a major offensive during the Tet holiday. They lost that battle. Badly! But the fact that they were able to mount such a large-scale offensive gave many Americans—including Walter Cronkite—the impression that the war wasn’t winnable. As “the U.S. is bogged down” became the common view, Johnson’s presidency fell to ashes. Not much chance Obama will go that route. **If the violence skyrockets** next year and it looks as though the president’s ambitious objectives can’t be met, **Afghanistan could look a lot more like Vietnam** in 1973. U.S. forces withdrew. Our abandoned ally was soon overrun. South Vietnam became a gulag; Cambodia sprouted the killing fields; life in Laos was just plain lousy. By 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese war erupted. We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and nuclear-arms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over. State-sponsorship of terrorism came into fashion. **Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe**. **Al-Qaida would be back in the game**. **Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India**—potentially **triggering a nuclear war between the two countries**. **Sensing a Washington in retreat**, **Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive**, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. **Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms** of their own. **The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous** than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff. **With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war.** The list goes on. There is no question that **countries such as Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus** as well. **That could produce all kinds of serious** regional **challenges** for the United States. Our **allies might rethink things as well**. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. **NATO might well fall apart**. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force **incapable of defending the interests of its nations.**

**Limited Indo-Pak war causes extinction**

**Toon et al 7** – Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @ University of Colorado – ‘7 [Owen B. Toon, Alan Robock (Professor of Environmental Sciences @ Rutgers University), Richard P. Turco (Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @ UCLA, Charles Bardeen (Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @ University of Colorado), Luke Oman (Professor of of Earth and Planetary Sciences @ Johns Hopkins University), Georgiy L. Stenchikov (Professor of Environmental Sciences @ Rutgers University), “NUCLEAR WAR: Consequences of Regional-Scale Nuclear Conflicts,” Science, 2 March 2007, Vol. 315. no. 5816, pp. 1224 – 1225]

The world may no longer face a serious threat of global nuclear warfare, but regional conflicts continue. Within this milieu, acquiring nuclear weapons has been considered a potent political, military, and social tool (1-3). National ownership of nuclear weapons offers perceived international status and insurance against aggression at a modest financial cost. Against this backdrop, we provide a quantitative assessment of the potential for casualties in a regional-scale nuclear conflict, or a terrorist attack, and the associated environmental impacts (4, 5). Eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons. In addition, North Korea may have a small, but growing, arsenal. Iran appears to be seeking nuclear weapons capability, but it probably needs several years to obtain enough fissionable material. Of great concern, 32 other nations--including Brazil, Argentina, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan--have sufficient fissionable materials to produce weapons (1, 6). A de facto nuclear arms race has emerged in Asia between China, India, and Pakistan, which could expand to include North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan (1). In the Middle East, a nuclear confrontation between Israel and Iran would be fearful. Saudi Arabia and Egypt could also seek nuclear weapons to balance Iran and Israel. Nuclear arms programs in South America, notably in Brazil and Argentina, were ended by several treaties in the 1990s (6). We can hope that these agreements will hold and will serve as a model for other regions, despite Brazil's new, large uranium enrichment facilities. Nuclear arsenals containing 50 or more weapons of low yield [15 kilotons (kt), equivalent to the Hiroshima bomb] are relatively easy to build (1, 6). India and Pakistan, the smallest nuclear powers, probably have such arsenals, although no nuclear state has ever disclosed its inventory of warheads (7). Modern weapons are compact and lightweight and are readily transported (by car, truck, missile, plane, or boat) (8). The basic concepts of weapons design can be found on of the Internet. The only serious obstacle to constructing a bomb is the limited availability of purified fissionable fuels.There are many political, economic, and social factors that could trigger a regional-scale nuclear conflict, plus many scenarios for the conduct of the ensuing war. We assumed (4) that the densest population centers in each country--usually in megacities--are attacked. We did not evaluate specific military targets and related casualties. We considered a nuclear exchange involving 100 weapons of 15-kt yield each, that is, ~0.3% of the total number of existing weapons (4). **India and Pakistan**, for instance, have previously tested nuclear weapons and are now thought to **have** between 109 and **172** **weapons** of unknown yield (9). Fatalities were estimated by means of a standard population database for a number of countries that might be targeted in a regional conflict (see figure, above). For instance, such **an exchange between India and Pakistan** (10) **could produce about 21 million fatalities**--about half as many as occurred globally during World War II. The direct effects of thermal radiation and nuclear blasts, as well as gamma-ray and neutron radiation within the first few minutes of the blast, would cause most casualties. Extensive damage to infrastructure, contamination by long-lived radionuclides, and psychological trauma would likely result in the indefinite abandonment of large areas leading to severe economic and social repercussions. **Fires ignited by nuclear bursts would release copious amounts of light-absorbing smoke into the upper atmosphere.** If 100 small nuclear weapons were detonated within cities, they could generate 1 to 5 million tons of carbonaceous smoke particles (4), darkening the sky and affecting the atmosphere more than major volcanic eruptions like Mt. Pinatubo (1991) or Tambora (1815) (5). Carbonaceous smoke particles are transported by winds throughout the atmosphere but also induce circulations in response to solar heating. Simulations (5) predict that such radiative-dynamical interactions would loft and stabilize the smoke aerosol, which would allow it to persist in the middle and upper atmosphere for a decade. Smoke emissions of 100 low-yield urban explosions in a regional nuclear conflict **would generate** **substantial global-scale climate anomalies**, although not as large as in previous "nuclear winter" scenarios for a full-scale war (11, 12). However, **indirect effects on surface land temperatures, precipitation rates, and growing season lengths** (see figure, below) **would** be likely to **degrade agricultural productivity** to an extent **that historically has led to famines** in Africa, India, and Japan after the 1783-1784 Laki eruption (13) or in the northeastern United States and Europe after the Tambora eruption of 1815 (5). Climatic anomalies could persist for a decade or more because of smoke stabilization, far longer than in previous nuclear winter calculations or after volcanic eruptions. Studies of the consequences of full-scale nuclear war show that **indirect effects** of the war could cause more casualties than direct ones, perhaps **eliminating the majority of the world's population** (11, 12). Indirect effects such as damage to transportation, energy, medical, political, and social infrastructure could be limited to the combatant nations in a regional war. However, **climate anomalies would threaten the world outside the combat** **zone**. The predicted smoke emissions and fatalities per kiloton of explosive yield are roughly 100 times those expected from estimates for full-scale nuclear attacks with high-yield weapons (4).

**Deterrence doesn’t check escalation**

**Weitz 10** [Richard, writes a weekly column on Asia-Pacific strategic and security issues. He is director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, The Diplomat, South Asia’s Nuclear War Risk

July 12, 2010, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/07/12/south-asia%e2%80%99s-nuclear-war-risk/4/?print=yes]

Yet even setting aside the question of nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands, **nuclear competition between India and Pakistan is especially dangerous. Active (and ongoing) political disputes between the two countries have resulted in three past wars as well as numerous proxy conflicts.** Pakistani leaders in particular have concluded that their nuclear arsenal has deterred India from again using its conventional forces to attack Pakistani territory. As a result, **Pakistan’s implicit nuclear doctrine presumes the possible first use of nuclear weapons. The risks of such tensions are compounded by the physical proximity of the two** countries, **as well as their reliance on ballistic missiles as delivery vehicles, which means that early warning times might be as little as five to ten minutes. Although it remains unclear whether India or Pakistan have combined its nuclear warheads with their assigned delivery systems, such a precarious stance would increase the risks of both accidental and catalytic war** (a nuclear conflict between both governments precipitated by a third party, such as a terrorist group). Throw China into the mix, with Pakistan at risk of viewing its own nuclear programme as increasingly inadequate as India seeks to achieve mutual deterrence with China, and the picture becomes more complicated. And add in the risk of widespread political disorder in either India or Pakistan, which could see a dangerous political adventurism as political leaders look to rally domestic support, and the peculiar challenges posed by the region become clearer. The fact is **South Asia is particularly prone to a destabilizing arms race. And perhaps nuclear war.**

**advantage 2 – Abstention**

**Failure of the Supreme Court to substantively rule on detention authority causes judicial abstention on national security issues**

**Vaughns 13** (B.A. (Political Science), J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.Of Civil Wrongs and Rights: Kiyemba v. Obama and the Meaning of Freedom, Separation of Powers, and the Rule of Law Ten Years After 9/11 ASIAN AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL [Volume 20:7])

After being reversed three times in a row in Rasul, Hamdan, and then Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit finally managed in Kiyemba to reassert, and have effectively sanctioned, its highly deferential stance towards the Executive in cases involving national security. In particular, the D.C. Circuit concluded that an order mandating the Uighurs’ release into the continental United States would impermissibly interfere with the political branches’ exclusive authority over immigration matters. But this reasoning is legal ground that the Supreme Court has already implicitly—and another three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit more explicitly—covered earlier. As such, **the Bush administration’s strategy in employing the “war” paradigm at all costs and without any judicial intervention**, while unsuccessful in the Supreme Court**, has finally paid off in troubling, and binding, fashion in the D.C. Court of Appeals**, **where, national security fundamentalism reigns supreme and the Executive’s powers as “Commander-in-Chief” can be exercised with little, if any, real check**; arguably **leading to judicial abstention in cases involving national security**. **The consequences of the Kiyemba decision** potentially **continue** today, for example, **with passage of the** **N**ational **D**efense **A**uthorization **A**ct of 2012,246 which President Obama signed, with reservations, into law on December 31, 2011.247 This defense authorization bill contains detainee provisions that civil liberties groups and human rights advocates have strongly opposed.248 The bill’s supporters strenuously objected to the assertion that these provisions authorize the indefinite detention of U.S. citizens.249 In signing the bill, President **Obama later issued a statement to the effect that although he had reservations about some of the provisions, he “vowed to use discretion when applying” them**.250 Of course, **that does not mean another administration would do the same, especially if courts abstain from their role as protectors of individual rights.** In the years after 9/11, **the Supreme Court asserted its role incrementally, slowly entering into the debate about the rights of enemy combatant detainees. This was a “somewhat novel role” for the Court**.251 Unsurprisingly, in so doing, **the Court’s intervention “strengthened detainee rights, enlarged the role of the judiciary, and rebuked broad assertions of executive power**.”252 Also unsurprisingly, **the Court’s decisions in this arena “prompted strong reactions from the other two branches**.”253 This may be so because, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the Court had, in the past, recognized the primacy of liberty interests only in quieter times, after national emergencies had terminated or perhaps before they ever began.254 However, since the twentieth century, wartime has been the “normal state of affairs.”255 If **perpetual war is the new “normal,” the political branches likely will be in a permanent state of alert. Thus, it remains for the courts to exercise vigilance and courage** about protecting individual rights, **even if these assertions of judicial authority come as a surprise to the political branches of government**.256 But courts, like any other institution, are susceptible to being swayed by influences external to the law. Joseph Margulies and Hope Metcalf make this very point in a 2011 article, noting that much of the post-9/11 scholarship mirrors this country’s early wartime cases and “envisions a country that veers off course at the onset of a military emergency but gradually steers back to a peacetime norm once the threat recedes, via primarily legal interventions.”257 This model, they state, “cannot explain a sudden return to the repressive wilderness just at the moment when it seemed the country had recovered its moral bearings.”258 Kiyemba is very much a return to the repressive wilderness. In thinking about the practical and political considerations that inevitably play a role in judicial decisionmaking (or non-decisionmaking, as the case may be), I note that **the Court tends to be reluctant to decide constitutional cases if it can avoid doing so**, as it did in Kiyemba. Arguably, **this doctrine of judicial abstention is tied to concerns of institutional viability**, in the form of public perception, and to concerns about respecting the separation of powers.259 But, as Justice Douglas once famously noted, when considering the separation of powers, the Court should be mindful of Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition that “it is a constitution we are expounding.”260 Consequently, “[i]t is far more important [for the Court] to be respectful to the Constitution than to a coordinate branch of government.”261 And **while brave jurists have made such assertions throughout the Court’s history, the Court is not without some pessimism about its ability to effectively protect civil liberties in wartimes or national emergencies.** For example, in Korematsu—one of the worst examples of judicial deference in times of crisis—Justice Jackson dissented, but he did so “with explicit resignation about judicial powerlessness,” and concern that it was widely believed that “civilian courts, up to and including his own Supreme Court, perhaps should abstain from attempting to hold military commanders to constitutional limits in wartime.”262 Significantly, even when faced with the belief that the effort may be futile, Justice Jackson dissented. As I describe in the following section, that dissent serves a valuable purpose. But, for the moment, I must consider the external influences on the court that resulted in that feeling of judicial futility.

**SCOTUS can restrain the president under authority granted by the Suspension Clause- that ensures precedent setting**

**Garrett 12** (Brandon, Roy L. and Rosamund Woodruff Morgan Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. HABEAS CORPUS AND DUE PROCESSCORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:47] page lexis)

T**he relationship between the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause has** **sweeping implications for** the **detention** of suspected terrorists and military engagements in multiple countries after September 11, 2001. In Boumediene v. Bush, **the Supreme Court** for the first time **clearly gave the Suspension Clause independent force as an affirmative source of judicial power** to adjudicate habeas petitions **and as a source of meaningful process to prisoners in custody**.15 As a consequence of this decision, **Congress now cannot enact jurisdictions tripping legislation to deny executive detainees access to judicial review of the type that it has twice tried and failed to do in the past decade**.16 A **noncitizen detained as a national security threat may now have procedural rights to contest the detention**.17 **Even as the Executive has crafted nuanced positions on power and procedure** for detaining persons for national security reasons, an**d even as Congress has adopted new detention-authorizing legislation,**1**8 the judiciary continues to play a central role,** though sometimes unwillingly and deferentially, **in detention review**.19 Apart from these specific developments, **I argue that the reinvigorated Suspension Clause jurisprudence will continue to have ripple effects across all areas regulated by habeas corpus.** What process must the government use to ensure that it detains the correct people? The traditional assumption was that the Due Process Clause provided the answers. Judges and scholars described a functional relationship in which due process supplied the rights while habeas provided the procedural means to vindicate them. Justice Antonin Scalia expressed this view in its starkest form in his INS v. St. Cyr dissent, arguing that the Suspension Clause “does not guarantee any content to (or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus.”20 Judges and scholars have long assumed that due process offers more protections than habeas corpus, or that the substance of habeas is coextensive with the Due Process Clause.21 Others have suggested that the Suspension Clause has a “structural” role, entwined with other individual rights guarantees.22 **The U.S. government, in the wake of** the **September 11, 2001** attacks, ad**opted the view that noncitizens captured and detained abroad had no due process rights and thus no habeas remedy**, and the D.C. Circuit agreed.23 In two cases that reshaped habeas jurisprudence, **Hamdi** v. Rumsfeld, decided in 2004,24 a**nd Boumediene**, decided in 2008,25 the Court connected the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause in a new way. Hamdi seemed to indicate that the Due Process Clause approach had triumphed. The Hamdi plurality applied the cost-benefit due process test from Mathews v. Eldridge26 to outline the procedural rights of citizens who challenge their detention.27 Following Hamdi, the precise scope of what due process required seemed the “looming question” for the future of executive detention.28 In response, the government hastily implemented administrative screening procedures for detainees, ostensibly to comply with the bare minimum that due process appeared to require.29 In Boumediene, the Court chose a different constitutional path. The Court did not discuss whether Guant´anamo detainees had due process rights, but instead held that the Suspension Clause independently supplies process to ensure review of executive detention.30 T**he Court put to rest the notion that the Suspension Clause is an empty vessel and regulates only the conditions for congressional suspension of the writ**. Instead, th**e Court held that the Suspension Clause itself extended “the fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus.**”31 The Court’s view complements recent scholarship examining the common law origins of habeas corpus.32 However, w**hile an- swering the Suspension Clause question, the ruling created another puzzle.** T**he Court held that a prisoner should have a “meaningful opportunity” to demonstrate unlawful confinement, but it did not specify what process the Suspension Clause ensures, nor to what degree due process concerns influence the analys**is.33 Lowe**r court rulings elaborating on the process for reviewing detainee petitions have displayed confusion as to which sources to rely on.**34 This Article tries to untangle this important knot.

**Judicial abstention props up military adventurism and illegal arms sales**

**Scales and Spitz 12** (Ann Scales, prof at U Denver law school. Laura Spitz, prof at U Colorado Law School. The Jurisprudence of the Military-Industrial ComplexSeattle Journal for Social Justice Volume 1 | Issue 3 Article 51 10-11-2012)

First, **our nation’s history and legitimacy rest upon a separation of military power from democratic governance**. For that reason, **the armed forces are subject to constitutional constraint**. Second, however, **as an aspect of separation of powers, courts try not to interfere in areas of foreign policy and military affairs**. Often this is referred to as the “political question” doctrine, a determination that a matter is beyond the capabilities of judges. **The strongest argument for this deference is that the political branches**—or the military itself—**have superior expertise in military matters**. **That may be true in some situations**. **I am not sure,** for example, **the Supreme Court would have been the best crowd to organize the invasion of Normandy**. **But what we now have is an increasingly irrational deference**.7 Consider three cases: a. In Korematsu v. United States,8 the Supreme Court said the internment of Japanese-Americans at the beginning of 1942 was constitutional, based upon a military assessment of the possibility of espionage in preparation for a Japanese invasion of the United States. It turns out that the information provided by the military to the Supreme Court was falsified.9 But note two things: (1) the nation was in the midst of a declared world war, and (2) in subsequent less urgent circumstances, Korematsu would seem to argue strongly for military justifications to have to be based upon better, more reliable information than was offered there. b. In the 1981 case of Rostker v. Goldberg,10 the Supreme Court decided that it was constitutional for Congress to exclude women from the peacetime registration of potential draftees, even though both the Department of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff had testified that including women would increase military readiness. But Congress got the benefit of the military deference doctrine as a cover for what I think was a sinister political purpose—to protect the manliness of war—and the Supreme Court felt perfectly free to ignore what those with the real expertise had to say. c. Most recently, **in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld**,11 **the Fourth Circuit held that a U.S. citizen who had been designated an “enemy combatant**”12 **could be detained indefinitely without access to counse**l. In this case, however, not only is there no declared war,13 but also, the only evidence regarding Mr. Hamdi was a two-page affidavit by a Defense Department underling, Mr. Mobbs. Mobbs stated that Mr. Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan, and had been affiliated with a Taliban military unit. The government would not disclose the criteria for the “enemy combatant” designation, the statements of Mr. Hamdi that allegedly satisfied those criteria, nor any other bases for the conclusion of Taliban “affiliation.”14 And that is as good as the evidence for life imprisonment without trial has to be. **Deference to the military has become abdication**. In other words, **what we presently have is not civilian government under military control, but something potentially worse, a civilian government ignoring military advice**,15 **but using the legal doctrine of military deference for its own imperialist ends**. Third, **the gigantic military establishment and permanent arms industry are now in the business of justifying their continued existences**. **This justification is done primarily, as you know, by retooling for post-Cold War enemies**—the so-called “rogue states”—**while at the same time creating new ones,** for example **by arming corrupt regimes** in Southeast Asia.16 I was reminded of this recently when we went to see comedian Kate Clinton. She thought Secretary Powell had taken too much trouble in his presentation attempting to convince the Security Council that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.17 Why not, she asked, “just show them the receipts?” Fourth, we **have seen the exercise of extraordinary influence by arms makers on both domestic and foreign policy**. For domestic pork barrel and campaign finance reasons, **obsolete or unproven weapons systems continue to be funded even when the military does not want them**!18 And, **just when we thought we had survived the nuclear arms race nightmare, the United States has undertaken to design new kinds of nuclear weapons**,19 even **when those designs have little military value**.20 Overseas, **limitations on arms sales are being repealed, and arms markets that should not exist are being constantly expanded21** for the sake of dumping inventory, even if those weapons are eventually used for “rogue” purposes by rogue states**. This system skews security considerations, and militarizes foreign policy.** Force has to be the preferred option because other conduits of policy are not sufficiently well-funded. Plus, those **stockpiled weapons have got to be used or sold so that we can build more**. Fifth, enlarging upon this in a document entitled The National Security Policy of the United States, **we were treated last September to “the Bush doctrine,” which for the first time in U.S. history declares a preemptive strike policy.** This document states, “America will act against emerging threats before they are fully formed.”22 If they are only emerging and not fully formed, you may wonder, how will we know they are “threats”? Because someone in Washington has that perception, and when the hunch hits, it is the official policy of this country to deploy the military.23 **All options—including the use of nuclear weapons—are always on the table**.

**Presidential adventurism causes nuclear war**

**Symonds 13** [Peter, leading staff writer for the World Socialist Web Site and a member of its International Editorial Board. He has written extensively on Middle Eastern and Asian politics, contributing articles on developments in a wide range of countries, 4-5, “Obama’s “playbook” and the threat of nuclear war in Asia,” <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/04/05/pers-a05.html>]

The Obama administration has engaged in **reckless provocations** against North Korea over the past month, inflaming tensions in North East Asia and **heightening the risks of war**. Its campaign has been accompanied by the relentless demonising of the North Korean regime and claims that the US military build-up was purely “defensive”. However, the Wall Street Journal and CNN revealed yesterday that the Pentagon was following a step-by-step plan, dubbed “the playbook”, drawn up months in advance and approved by the Obama administration earlier in the year. The flights to South Korea by nuclear capable B-52 bombers on March 8 and March 26, by B-2 bombers on March 28, and by advanced F-22 Raptor fighters on March 31 were all part of the script.¶ There is of course nothing “defensive” about B-52 and B-2 nuclear strategic bombers. The flights were designed to demonstrate, to North Korea in the first instance, the ability of the US military to conduct nuclear strikes at will anywhere in North East Asia. The Pentagon also exploited the opportunity to announce the boosting of anti-ballistic missile systems in the Asia Pacific and to station two US anti-missile destroyers off the Korean coast.¶ According to CNN, the “playbook” was drawn up by former defence secretary Leon Panetta and “supported strongly” by his replacement, Chuck Hagel. The plan was based on US intelligence assessments that “there was a low probability of a North Korean military response”—in other words, that Pyongyang posed no serious threat. Unnamed American officials claimed that Washington was now stepping back, amid concerns that the US provocations “could lead to miscalculations” by North Korea.¶ However, having deliberately ignited one of the most dangerous flashpoints in Asia, there are no signs that the Obama administration is backing off. Indeed, on Wednesday, Defence Secretary Hagel emphasised the military threat posed by North Korea, declaring that it presented “a real and clear danger”. The choice of words was deliberate and menacing—an echo of the phrase “a clear and present danger” used to justify past US wars of aggression.¶ The unstable and divided North Korean regime has played directly into the hands of Washington. Its bellicose statements and empty military threats have nothing to do with a genuine struggle against imperialism and are inimical to the interests of the international working class. Far from opposing imperialism, its Stalinist leaders are looking for a deal with the US and its allies to end their decades-long economic blockade and open up the country as a new cheap labour platform for global corporations.¶ As the present standoff shows, Pyongyang’s acquisition of a few crude nuclear weapons has in no way enhanced its defence against an American attack. The two B-2 stealth bombers that flew to South Korea could unleash enough nuclear weapons to destroy the country’s entire industrial and military capacity and murder even more than the estimated 2 million North Korean civilians killed by the three years of US war in Korea in the 1950s.¶ North Korea’s wild threats to attack American, Japanese and South Korean cities only compound the climate of fear used by the ruling classes to divide the international working class—the only social force capable of preventing war.¶ Commentators in the international media speculate endlessly on the reasons for the North Korean regime’s behaviour. But the real question, which is never asked, should be: why is the Obama administration engaged in the dangerous escalation of tensions in North East Asia? The latest US military moves go well beyond the steps taken in December 2010, when the US and South Korean navies held provocative joint exercises in water adjacent to both North Korea and China.¶ Obama’s North Korea “playbook” is just one aspect of his so-called “pivot to Asia”—a comprehensive diplomatic, economic and military strategy aimed at ensuring the continued US domination of Asia. The US has stirred up flashpoints throughout the region and created new ones, such as the conflict between Japan and China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Obama’s chief target is not economically bankrupt North Korea, but its ally China, which Washington regards as a dangerous potential rival. Driven by the deepening global economic crisis, US imperialism is using its military might to assert its hegemony over Asia and the entire planet.¶ The US has declared that its military moves against North Korea are designed to “reassure” its allies, Japan and South Korea, that it will protect them. Prominent figures in both countries have called for the development of their own nuclear weapons. US “reassurances” are aimed at heading off a nuclear arms race in North East Asia—not to secure peace, but to reinforce the American nuclear monopoly.¶ The ratcheting-up of tensions over North Korea places enormous pressures on China and the newly-selected leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. An unprecedented public debate has opened up in Beijing over whether or not to continue to support Pyongyang. The Chinese leadership has always regarded the North Korean regime as an important buffer on its northeastern borders, but now fears that the constant tension on the Korean peninsula will be exploited by the US and its allies to launch a huge military build-up.¶ Indeed, all of the Pentagon’s steps over the past month—the boosting of anti-missile systems and practice runs of nuclear capable bombers—have enhanced the ability of the US to fight a nuclear war against China. Moreover, the US may not want to provoke a war, but its provocations always run the risk of escalating dangerously out of control. Undoubtedly, Obama’s “playbook” for war in Asia contains many more steps beyond the handful leaked to the media. The Pentagon plans for all eventualities, including the possibility that a Korean crisis could bring the US and China head to head **in a** catastrophic **nuclear conflict**.

**Arms sales increase the probability of regional conflict and leads to US-Russia-China escalation**

**Klare 13** (Michael Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College The Booming Global Arms Trade Is Creating a New Cold War http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/global-arms-trade-new-cold-war)

These are just some examples of **recent arms deal**s (or ones under discussion) that **suggest a fresh willingness** on the part of the major powers **to use weapons transfers as instruments of geopolitical intrusion and competition**. **The reappearance of such behavior suggests a troubling resurgence of** **Cold War-like rivalries**. Even if senior leaders in **Washington, Moscow, and Beijing** are not talking about resurrecting some twenty-first-century version of the Cold War, **anyone with a sense of history can see** that **they are headed down a grim**, well-trodden **path toward crisis and confrontation**. What gives this an added touch of irony is that **leading arms suppliers and recipients, including the** **U**nited **S**tates, recently [**voted**](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/world/arms-trade-treaty-approved-at-un.html)in the U.N. General Assembly **to approve the** [**Arms Trade Treaty**](http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/) that was meant to impose significant constraints on the global trade in conventional weapons. Although **the treaty has many loopholes, lacks an enforcement mechanism, and will require years to achieve full implementation**, it represents the first genuine attempt by the international community to place real restraints on weapons sales. "This treaty won't solve the problems of Syria overnight, no treaty could do that, but it will help to prevent future Syrias," [said](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/world/arms-trade-treaty-approved-at-un.html) Anna MacDonald, the head of arms control for [Oxfam International](http://www.oxfam.org/) and an ardent treaty supporter. "It will help to reduce armed violence. It will help to reduce conflict." This may be the hope, but such **expectations will quickly be crushed if the major weapons suppliers, led by the US** and Russia, once again **come to see arms sales as the tool of choice to gain geopolitical advantage in areas of strategic importance**. **Far from bringing peace and stability**—as the proponents of such transactions invariably claim—**each new arms deal now holds the possibility of taking us another step closer to a new Cold War with all the heightened risks of regional friction and conflict that entails**. Are we, in fact, seeing a mindless new example of the old saw: that those who don't learn from history are destined to repeat it?

**Risk of accidental exchange between the US and Russia over external crises is still high and risks extinction**

**Barrett et al. 13** (Anthony M. Barrett- Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Seth D. Baum- Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University, Kelly R. Hostetler- Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University, 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia”, http://sethbaum.com/ac/fc\_NuclearWar.pdf)

**War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals**, which are by far the largest of any nations, **could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years**, 1,2,3,4,5,6 potentially **leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the extinction of humanity**. 7,8,9,10 **Nuclear war between the US and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch**; deliberate first attack by one nation; **and inadvertent attack**. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs**. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack**. 11,12 (**Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve deliberate manipulation of the risk of otherwise unauthorized or inadvertent attack as part of coercive threats that “leave something to chance,”** i.e., “**taking steps that raise the risk that the crisis will go out of control and end in a general nuclear exchange.”** 13,14 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. 15,16,17 For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 18,19,20 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 21,22 However, it has also been argued that **inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk**. 23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,**33 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack**. 34,35,36,37,38 **False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways**. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 39 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 40,41,42 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 43 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 44 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 45,46,47 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 48,**49 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions**, 50,51,52,53 **with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example of such a crisis**. 54,55,56,57,58 **It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions**. 59 **There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks**. 60,61,62,63

**China war causes extinction- even with a swift victory**

**Wittner 11** (11/30/11 Dr. Lawrence, Prof of History Emeritus at SUNY Albany, “Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?”)

But what would that "victory" entail? **An attack with these Chinese nuclear weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire,** **while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher**. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, **radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a "nuclear winter" around the globe** -- **destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction**. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is [expected](http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-35-125.pdf) to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has [plans](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/30/nuclear-powers-weapons-spending-report) to spend hundreds of billions of dollars "modernizing" its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.

**solvency**

#### Detention policy is incomprehensible in the status quo- only Supreme Court rulings send a clear judicial review test for lower court judges and spills over to effective Congressional policy

Garrett 12 (Brandon, Roy L. and Rosamund Woodruff Morgan Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. HABEAS CORPUS AND DUE PROCESSCORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:47] page lexis)

The Suspension Clause casts a broad shadow over the regulation of all forms of detention. It has exerted direct and indirect influence even in contexts where statutes largely supplant habeas corpus as the primary vehicle for judicial review. The Executive, courts, and Congress have long been concerned with avoiding Suspension Clause problems, and the Supreme Court’s own sometimes-carried-out warnings that it will narrowly interpret efforts to restrict judicial review to avoid potential Suspension Clause problems have, many years before Boumediene, helped to structure judicial review of detention. I have argued that the Suspension Clause explains why, as the Court put it in INS v. St. Cyr, “[a]t its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.”451 Post- Boumediene, judges may rely on the Suspension Clause more directly, and not just as a principle of constitutional avoidance. Understanding the Suspension Clause as affirmatively guaranteeing a right to habeas process to independently examine the authorization for a detention helps to explain habeas and constitutional doctrine across a range of areas. Why does habeas corpus sometimes provide access to process unavailable under the Due Process Clause, while sometimes due process provides more process than habeas would? At its core, habeas corpus provides judges with process in situations where the need for review of legal and factual questions surrounding detention is most pressing. This view of habeas process can be seen as related to the Court’s long line of decisions that guarantee a “right of access” to courts without clarifying the source of that “[s]ubstantive [r]ight.”452 In Boumediene, the Court grounded that right in the Suspension Clause. This basis for the right makes some sense of the varied nature of habeas review in which statutes and case law differ depending on the type of detention. Judicial review does not vary categorically; for example, immigration does not receive less review than postconviction or military detention habeas. Instead, judicial review varies within each category. This is the product of evolving executive detention policies, varying postconviction practice, and changes over time in federal statutes, some poorly conceived and some sensible. No one actor provides coherence to habeas practice at any time, and some of the statutes are notoriously Byzantine, poorly drafted, and illogical. Judges have long played, however, an important role in interpreting the writ (and the underlying constitutional rights). Indeed, for some time, the Supreme Court’s interventions have reinforced the role habeas plays, particularly in the executive detention context. In response to the Court’s habeas rulings, which generally avoid defining the precise reach of the Suspension Clause, Congress has drafted statutes to preserve judicial review of detentions in an effort to steer clear of Suspension Clause problems, with mixed results.

Ruling on the Suspension Clause ensures judicial review over all executive detention- prevents circumvention and ensures due process rights

Garrett 12 (Brandon, Roy L. and Rosamund Woodruff Morgan Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. HABEAS CORPUS AND DUE PROCESSCORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:47] page lexis)

The Suspension Clause has long cast a shadow over the regulation of detention. Now the Supreme Court has brought the Clause out of the shadows, giving it substance. It does not merely describe when the government may suspend the writ, nor does it solely reflect an important principle of constitutional avoidance in interpreting statutes that restrict judicial review of detention. Instead, the Clause affirmatively offers a simple but powerful form of process to detainees. Moreover, the Court emphasized a Suspension Clause concern with both legal and factual error. This Article has explored this new understanding of the Suspension Clause in light of the changing and unsettled relationship between two complex areas of law: due process and habeas corpus. Both “due process and habeas corpus are quite general, amorphous, and capacious” in their content.508 Despite ring- ing language uniting habeas and due process in a tradition dating back to Magna Carta, habeas and due process cover importantly different terrain. The Suspension Clause supplies process in circumstances where the Due Process Clause does not apply, while due process has varied applications outside areas covered by habeas corpus. In executive detentions, however, the Suspension Clause plays an outsized role. Taken seriously, the Court in Hamdi and Boumediene forged a relationship between the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause. Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai examined what circumstances justify “constitutional borrowing” and noted concerns where there is a lack of fit, a lack of transparency, and incomplete application from one area of constitutional law to another.509 In *Boumediene*, the Court was careful not to explicitly borrow due process standards. The Court’s caution was justified. While due process analysis focuses on adequacy of procedures, habeas process provides the authority for judges to examine the factual and legal authorization for detention. Though habeas process may be “skeletal” in its outlines, both at common law and in modern federal statutes, it provides judges a powerful tool. In significant ways, complex and sometimes poorly conceived distinctions in statutes nevertheless respect core habeas process, in part due to the judicial interventions. I have argued that *Boumediene* was no innovation, but rather it followed the longstanding view that habeas is at its most expansive concerning detention without a trial. The Suspension Clause demands that habeas corpus remain in full force where there was no adequate prior judicial process, particularly in the context of indefinite detentions. This places the judiciary in the uncomfortable position of reviewing broad congressional authorizations for detentions and changing executive procedures in factually and legally contested detainee petitions. Thrust into that difficult role, lower courts have often relied upon inapposite sources, hewing to some vision of a bare constitutional minimum rather than providing a meaningful habeas process. The D.C. Circuit approves a standard of proof that is too lenient as defined, if not also in application. Its approach unduly limits discovery and uses an odd harmless error rule. In other respects, rulings have done a better job harmonizing evidentiary and criminal procedure rules with habeas process. Careful application could avoid unfortunate rulings, with an exception: the decision not to extend habeas to Bagram was partially due to Boumediene’s misstep in adopting a multifactored jurisdictional test.510 Congress has preserved the central role of the judiciary in the contest over what procedures should govern review of national security detention. Although the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 contains broad authorization for detention, it does not alter or address procedural aspects of judicial review, despite calls to do so.511 Perhaps Congress has reached a stable equilibrium. Judges’ approaches to future detentions and detention legislation in future conflicts will focus on the Suspension Clause question. If Congress centers review in an enhanced version of CSRTs, if POWs receive military hearings and demand access to habeas, or if Congress creates a national security court with Article III judges but streamlined procedure, courts will ask whether each is an adequate and effective substitute for habeas, and not simply whether general procedures satisfy due process. In some cases, the answer might be the same under a habeas or due process approach, but only if judges retain the power to adequately review authorization for detentions. Moreover, *Boumediene* will continue to impact all of habeas corpus, ranging from judicial review under immigration statutes to central questions in postconviction law, including actual-innocence claims. The connection between habeas corpus and due process has been long celebrated. Daniel Meador heralded how “[f]lexibility to meet new problems is one of the characteristics of both due process and habeas corpus, and the value of the habeas corpus—due process combination as protection against arbitrary imprisonment—can hardly be exaggerated.”512 Yet the virtues of flexibility include the vices of malleability. The Suspension Clause jurisprudence forged in the wake of Hamdi and Boumediene suggests that connecting habeas corpus and due process requires great care. The structural role of the Suspension Clause is now firmly established. Contrary to expectations, after exerting its influence in the shadows for so long, the Clause anchors a process animating the operation of far-flung aspects of habeas corpus, ranging from military detention, to immigration detention, to postconviction review. While due process and habeas corpus overlap in some of the protections they provide, a judge asks different questions when examining a due process claim versus a habeas challenge to custody. A judge examining a due process claim will focus on the general adequacy of the procedures employed. A judge examining a habeas challenge will focus on the legal and factual authorization of an individual detention, and in more troubling cases, on the larger Suspension Clause question of whether federal judges have an adequate and effective ability to examine that question of authorization. The roles of habeas and due process are distinct and in important respects they share an inverse relationship—habeas corpus can fill the breach when due process is inadequate. The Suspension Clause ensures that habeas corpus serves a powerful, independent, and unappreciated role standing alone.

#### Applying a clear statement principle solves- significantly restricts detention authority

Sarah Erickson-Muschko (J.D., Georgetown University Law Center) June 2013 “Beyond Individual Status: The Clear Statement Rule and the Scope of the AUMF Detention Authority in the United States” 101 Geo. L.J. 1399, Lexis

III. EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP ON THE CLEAR STATEMENT RULE: THE FOCUS ON INDIVIDUAL STATUS

Many scholars have advanced arguments regarding the application of a clear statement principle to the AUMF. 133 Two specific arguments have been made [\*1419] about the applicability of a clear statement principle in the context of U.S. territory, both of which focus on the status of the individual as the triggering factor. Professors Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer argue that a clear statement principle applies when U.S. citizens are detained on U.S. territory. 134 This argument is based on statutory grounds, namely the theory that the Non-Detention Act triggers the clear statement requirement. 135 This argument is perfectly sound in that respect. However, it is incomplete in that it does not address the constitutional grounds for imposing a clear statement rule: the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to all persons, including noncitizens. 136 Reading the AUMF and the NDAA 2012 together to allow for the indefinite military detention without trial of individuals arrested on U.S. territory would be inconsistent with the constitutional prohibition on depriving a person of liberty without due process of law. Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith offer the most comprehensive constitutionally based argument for when and how to apply a clear statement principle. Their position is that courts should apply a clear statement requirement "when the President takes actions under the AUMF that restrict the liberty of noncombatants in the United States," but not when such actions only restrict the liberty of combatants. 137 Looking to the three World-War-II-era decisions discussed in Part II, they conclude that Endo and Duncan stand for the proposition that liberty interests trump the President's commander-in-chief authority when the President's actions are unsupported by historical practice in other wars and affect the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens who are not combatants. 138 In this context, "the canon protecting constitutional liberties prevails." 139 In contrast, the authors point to Quirin to show that "the Court did not demand a clear statement before concluding that the U.S. citizen enemy combatant in that case could be subject to a military commission trial in the United States even though neither the authorization to use force nor the authorization for military commissions specifically mentioned U.S. citizens." 140 In such a case, the authors contend that a clear statement requirement protecting civil liberties is not required because "the presidential action involves a traditional wartime function exercised by the President against an acknowledged enemy combatant or enemy [\*1420] nation." 141 In this context, "the President's Article II powers are at their height, and the relevant liberty interests (and thus the need for a liberty-protecting clear statement requirement) are reduced (or nonexistent)." 142 Despite its level of detail, Bradley and Goldsmith's clear statement principle will likely never be of much help to courts construing the AUMF. By basing their clear statement requirement on the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, they fail to resolve the key interpretive question: namely, how to construe the AUMF to avoid grave constitutional concerns where an individual's status as an enemy combatant is in dispute. Their interpretation accommodates a broad reading of Quirin. However, in Quirin, nobody disputed that the detainees were in fact unlawful enemy combatants under long-standing law-of-war principles. In contrast, a court reviewing the classification of an individual as an "enemy combatant" under the AUMF and NDAA 2012 must determine what it means to be "part of" or provide "substantial[] support[]" to al-Qaeda or an "associated force[]" or otherwise to commit a "belligerent act." 143 The question of how to construe these terms lies at the core of detainee litigation, 144 and the provisions in the NDAA 2012 failed to clarify their meaning. Bradley and Goldsmith acknowledge that the AUMF is silent on the point of "what institutions or procedures are appropriate for determining whether a person captured and detained on U.S. soil is in fact an enemy combatant." 145 However, they fail to address how this ambiguity impacts the application of their clear statement principle. Their framework is therefore of no real help to courts that must first determine whether an individual was properly deemed to be an "enemy combatant" before determining whether the clear statement rule applies to thee AUMF. The clear statement rule thus fails to fulfill its core purpose of resolving statutory ambiguity in a manner that avoids serious constitutional questions. In addition to failing to resolve the due process questions surrounding the [\*1421] "enemy combatant" determination, Bradley and Goldsmith's argument does not resolve the core separation of powers concern: namely, whether, and if so under what conditions, it is constitutionally permissible for the President to apply martial law in place of the criminal justice system on U.S. territory despite the absence of any compelling need to do so. In short, their argument assumes that such an application of law-of-war principles on U.S. territory, outside of the battlefield context, would be a legitimate exercise of the President's war powers in the context of counterterrorism. This is hard to square with the Milligan Court's powerful statements to the contrary. 146 IV. MOVING BEYOND INDIVIDUAL STATUS: THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES IN THE UNITED STATES This Note argues that the clear statement principle applies to the AUMF detention authority whenever it is invoked to detain individuals arrested within the United States--at least where the enemy combatant question is in dispute. The principal trigger for application of the clear statement principle should not be an individual's status but rather the presumption that constitutional rights and restraints apply on U.S. territory. Courts therefore should dispense with the enemy combatant inquiry under these circumstances. This Note posits that such a construction is required to preserve the constitutionality of the AUMF. This constitutional default rule presumes that Congress has not delegated power to the executive branch to circumvent due process protections wholesale, and that it has not altered the traditional boundaries between military and civilian power on U.S. territory. Any departure from this baseline at least requires a clear manifestation of congressional intent. As evinced by the divisions in Congress over passage of the detention provisions in the NDAA 2012, there is no consensus as to the breadth of the detention power afforded to the executive branch under the AUMF. Courts should therefore not presume that the statute authorizes application of martial law to circumvent otherwise applicable constitutional restraints and due process rights. By making the jurisdictional question--civilian versus military--the trigger for the clear statement principle, the judiciary would properly place the impetus on Congress to clearly define and narrowly circumscribe the conditions under which the executive may use military jurisdiction to detain individuals on U.S. territory. This is the only way to ensure that our nation's political representatives have adequately deliberated and reached a consensus with respect to delegating powers to the executive branch where such delegation would have the consequence of displacing, in a wholesale fashion, constitutional protections. For all its controversy, § 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 provides an example of where Congress has provided for executive detention under circumstances that are arguably sufficiently detailed to satisfy a clear statement [\*1422] requirement. 147 Absent this level of clarity, where the President purports to use the AUMF to detain militarily on U.S. territory, courts must presume that constitutional rights and restraints apply and are not displaced by martial law. A. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS One of the most basic rights accorded by the Constitution is the fundamental right to be free from deprivations of liberty absent due process of law. The AUMF must be read with the gravity of this fundamental right in mind. As the Court made clear in Endo, where fundamental due process rights are at stake, ambiguous wartime statutes are to be construed to allow for "the greatest possible accommodation of the liberties of the citizen." 148 Courts "must assume, when asked to find implied powers in a grant of legislative or executive authority, that the law makers intended to place no greater restraint on the citizen than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language they used." 149 This includes statutes that would otherwise "exceed the boundaries between military and civilian power, in which our people have always believed, which responsible military and executive officers had heeded, and which had become part of our political philosophy and institutions . . . ." 150 B. THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE The Suspension Clause lends further constitutional support to applying a clear statement requirement to the AUMF detention authority on U.S. territory. The Suspension Clause gives Congress the emergency power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus "when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." 151 As Fallon and Meltzer observe, this Clause--and the limited circumstances in which it may be invoked--suggest, or even explicitly affirm, "the presumptive rule that when the civilian courts remain capable of dealing with threats posed by citizens, those courts must be permitted to function." 152 To interpret the AUMF as congressional authorization to displace the civilian system and apply military jurisdiction on U.S. territory would "render that [\*1423] emergency power essentially redundant." 153 The Suspension Clause also underscores that the right to be free from the arbitrary deprivation of physical liberty is one of the most central rights that the Constitution was intended to protect. C. THE LACK OF MILITARY NECESSITY The lack of military necessity for applying law-of-war principles on U.S. territory further supports the construction of the AUMF to avoid displacing civilian law with law of war in the domestic context. The Supreme Court long ago declared that martial law may not be applied on U.S. territory when civilian law is functioning and "the courts are open and their process unobstructed." 154 Instead, "[t]he necessity [for martial law] must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration." 155 In the absence of such necessity, "[w]hen peace prevails, and the authority of the government is undisputed, there is no difficulty of preserving the safeguards of liberty . . . ." 156 The past ten years have shown that there is no need to stretch law-of-war principles in the AUMF to reach U.S. territory. The exigencies associated with an active battlefield, which were critical to the Hamdi plurality's interpretation of the AUMF, 157 are simply not present in the United States. Instead, "American law enforcement agencies . . . continue to operate within the United States. These agencies have a powerful set of legal tools, adapted to the criminal process, to deploy within the United States against . . . suspected [terrorists], and the civilian courts remain open to impose criminal punishment." 158 Indeed, for more than a decade since the 9/11 attacks, domestic law enforcement agencies have carried the responsibility for domestic counterterrorism and have successfully thwarted several terrorism plots. 159 Civilian courts have adjudicated the prosecution of suspected terrorists captured on U.S. territory under [\*1424] federal laws. 160 The experience of the past decade shows that the civilian system is up to the task, and there is no military exigency that justifies curtailing constitutional protections and applying military authority in the domestic context. 161 Accordingly, the circumstances that the Supreme Court found to justify the use of the military authority under the AUMF to capture and indefinitely detain Hamdi, who was found armed on the active battlefield in Afghanistan, do not extend to persons captured on U.S. territory. The manner in which the government handled the Padilla and al-Marri cases further demonstrates the lack of military necessity. In both cases, the government abandoned its position that national security imperatives demanded that they continue to be held in military custody; both were transferred to federal custody and ultimately convicted of federal crimes carrying lengthy prison terms. 162 The Supreme Court's precedent in Quirin neither requires, nor can it be fairly read to justify, a different conclusion. First, the issue of indefinite military detention without trial was not before the Court in that case. Second, the status of the Nazis in Quirin as enemy combatants was undisputed, in contrast to that of individuals who are "part of" or "substantially support" al-Qaeda or "associated forces." 163 Third, the Court in Quirin went "out of its way to say that the Court's holding was extremely limited," encompassing only the precise factual circumstances before it. 164 Finally, Quirin itself is shaky precedent, as evidenced by the Court's own subsequent statements and as elaborated in numerous scholarly commentaries on the case. 165 As Katyal and Tribe observe: Quirin plainly fits the criteria typically offered for judicial confinement or reconsideration: It was a decision rendered under extreme time pressure, with respect to which there are virtually no reliance interests at stake, and where the statute itself has constitutional dimensions suggesting that its construction should be guided by relevant developments in constitutional law. 166 [\*1425] This case therefore should not be read as foreclosing the application of a clear statement principle to the AUMF as applied on U.S. territory where an individual's status as an enemy combatant is in dispute. CONCLUSION The AUMF is ambiguous: it does not specify whether it reaches individuals captured on U.S. territory, and Congress declined to resolve this question when it enacted § 1021 of the NDAA 2012. If a future administration invokes the AUMF as authority to capture and hold persons on U.S. territory in indefinite military detention, it will be left to the courts to determine whether this is constitutional. Courts should resolve this question by applying a clear statement requirement. This Note has argued that the trigger for this clear statement requirement is not the individual's status but rather the presumption that constitutional rights and restraints apply on U.S territory. Courts should apply this default presumption regardless of an individual's citizenship status, and it should apply even where the government claims that the individual is an "enemy combatant," at least where that determination is subject to dispute. This Note has argued that this method of statutory interpretation is constitutionally required. "[B]y extending to all 'persons' within the Constitution's reach such guarantees as . . . due process of law, the Constitution constrains how our government may conduct itself in bringing terrorists to justice." 167 If these constraints are to remain meaningful, these guarantees require, at the very least, that courts presume that constitutional guarantees prevail where congressional intent is unclear. The past ten years have shown that our criminal justice system is capable of thwarting terrorist attacks and bringing terrorists to justice while still preserving the safeguards of liberty that are fundamental to our system of justice. "[T]hese safeguards need, and should receive, the watchful care of those [e]ntrusted with the guardianship of the Constitution and laws." 168

**Observer effect solves- assumes all of their empirics and warrants**

**Deeks 13** (Ashley, Ashbley Deeks served as an attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State. She worked on issues related to the law of armed conflict, including detention, the U.S. relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross, conventional weapons, and the legal framework for the conflict with al-Qaeda. Courts Can Influence National Security Without Doing a Single Thing <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115270/courts-influence-national-security-merely-watching>)

**While courts rarely intervene directly in national security** disputes, **they nevertheless play a significant role in shaping** Executive branch **security policies**. **Let’s call this the “observer effect.”** Physics teaches us that observing a particle alters how it behaves. Through psychology, we know that **people act differently when they are aware that someone is watching them**. In the national security context, **the “observer effect” can be thought of as the impact on** **Executive policy-setting** **of** pending or **probable court consideration of a** specific national security p**olicy**. The Executive’s **awareness of likely judicial oversight** over particular national security policies—an awareness that ebbs and flows—**plays a significant role as a forcing mechanism.** **It drives the Executive to alter**, disclose, and improve those **policies before courts actually review them.** **Take, for example, U.S. detention policy in Afghanistan**. **After several detainees held by the** **U**nited **S**tates **asked U.S courts to review** their **detention, the Executive changed its policies to give detainees** in Afghanistan **a greater ability to appeal** their detention—a change made in response to the pending litigation and in an effort to avoid an adverse decision by the court. The Government went on to win the litigation. A year later, the detainees re-filed their case, claiming that new facts had come to light. Just before the government’s brief was due in court, the process repeated itself, with the Obama Administration revealing another rule change that favored the petitioners. Exchanges between detainees and their personal representatives would be considered confidential, creating something akin to the attorney-client privilege. Thus **we see the Executive shifting its policies in a more rights-protective direction without a court ordering it to do so.**

Failing to articulate habeas standards for lower court judges makes indefinite detention inevitable and triggers your disads

Sparrow 11 (Indefinite Detention After Boumediene: Judicial Trailblazing in Uncharted and Unfamiliar Territory SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. XLIV:261 p lexis Tyler Sparrow is an associate in the Securities Department, and a member of the Litigation and Enforcement Practice Group]

This section will argue that the current guidance on detainee habeas corpus actions offered by the Supreme Court as well as the Executive and Legislative branches is vague and inadequate.100 Because of this inadequacy, federal district court judges cannot proceed with any confidence that their judgments will stand, nor can the litigants form any reasonable predictions from the case law.101 This section will then examine how more definitive Supreme Court precedent would help to unify the case law dealing with detainee habeas corpus actions.102 Finally, this section will argue that adoption of legislation clearly addressing the substantive scope of the government’s detention authority would clarify the law for the public, the federal courts, and most importantly those detained without charge.103 The Supreme Court’s holding in Boumediene was limited to the constitutional issues regarding Guantanamo detainees’ access to the writ of habeas corpus, leaving all questions of procedure and substantive scope-ofdetention authority to the lower federal courts.104 This lack of guidance has drawn criticism from legal scholars and federal judges alike.105 A group of noted legal scholars observed that, in holding Guantanamo detainees were entitled to seek the writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court “gave only the barest sketch of what such proceedings should look like, leaving a raft of questions open for the district and appellate court judges.”106 Furthermore, the Obama Administration has stated that it will not seek further legislation from Congress to justify or clarify its detention authority.107 This lack of guidance has led to disparate results in detainee habeas corpus actions with similar facts, based not on the merits of the cases, but rather on which particular judge hears the petition.108 B. Need for Supreme Court Precedent Addressing Standards and Procedure for Detainee Habeas Corpus Actions The Supreme Court’s refusal to address the substantive scope of the government’s detention authority in Boumediene has left the task to federal district court judges, who are free to apply whichever standard they see fit, regardless of its disparity from the standard being applied down the hall of the very same courthouse.109 For instance, it is up to the district judges whether to analyze detention authority under the rubric of “substantial support” for the Taliban and/or Al Qaeda, or the rubric pertaining to being a “part of” either of these groups.110 There are also differing opinions as to when, and how long, a detainee’s relationship with the Taliban and/or Al Qaeda must have existed to justify detention, under either the “part of” or “substantial support” rationales.111 Differing judicial approaches can also be seen in the weight of evidence required to justify detention, as well as how to treat hearsay and evidence obtained in the face of coercion.112 This creates a situation where neither the government nor the detainee “can be sure of the rules of the road in the ongoing litigation, and the prospect that allocation of a case to a particular judge may prove dispositive on the merits can cut in either direction.”113 The Supreme Court has the opportunity to unify these divergent paths by finally ruling on questions such as the substantive scope of the government’s detention authority, the standard and weight of evidence required for continued detention, whether a relationship with the Taliban and/or Al Qaeda can be sufficiently vitiated, and the reliability of hearsay evidence and statements made under coercion.114

#### No executive circumvention

Green 11 (Craig, Prof of Law at Temple Unviersity , Northwestern University Law Review, Vol 105, No 3"Ending the Korematsu Era: An Early View From the War on Terror Cases")

Jackson’s hard-nosed analysis may seem intellectually bracing, but it understates the real-world power of judicial precedent to shape what is po- litically possible.306 Although presidential speeches occasionally declare a willingness to disobey Supreme Court rulings, actual disobedience of this sort is rare and would carry grave political consequences.307 Even President Bush’s losses in the GWOT cases did not spur serious consideration of noncompliance despite broad support from a Republican Congress.308 Likewise, from the perspective of strengthening presidential power, Kore- matsu-era decisions emboldened President Bush in his twenty-first-century choices about Guantánamo and military commissions.309 Thus, the modern historical record shows that judicial precedent can both expand and restrict the political sphere of presidential action.¶ The operative influence of judicial precedent is even stronger than a court-focused record might suggest, as the past sixty years have witnessed a massive bureaucratization and legalization of all levels of executive gov- ernment.310 From the White House Counsel, to the Pentagon, to other enti- ties addressing intelligence and national security issues, lawyers now occupy such high-level governmental posts that almost no significant policy is determined without multiple layers of legal review.311 And these execu- tive lawyers are predominantly trained to think—whatever else they may believe—that Supreme Court precedent is authoritative and binding.312